For the larger part, Islamabad was not setting the agenda, only facilitating communication. That changed at the end of February, when the outbreak of all-out war altered ground realities.
What started as discreet facilitation quickly levelled up into something more ambitious, with Pakistan hosting delegations and publicly positioning itself as a bridge between Washington and Tehran.On March 24, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan would “facilitate” dialogue, a formulation that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed a week later at the end of a quadrilateral meeting, when he said Pakistan would “host and facilitate meaningful talks”.
From the UN chief to the Kremlin, Islamabad’s efforts to mediate between the US and Iran have won it universal acclaim. Although experts agree Pakistan is best-positioned for this role, lasting outcomes are not reached overnight and require structured engagement
After the first round in Islamabad earlier this month, that description was altered once again, when Dar said on April 12 that he, along with Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, had “helped mediate several rounds of intense and constructive negotiations”.
The change in language was not incidental, rather, it signalled a willingness to place national credibility behind a process whose outcome remains uncertain, at least for the time being.
Why Islamabad?
Part of the explanation for this lies in geography. Pakistan sits next to Iran and within strategic reach of the Gulf, while maintaining longstanding security ties with the US.
But geography alone does not create a mediator. The shift, in fact, reflects a search for enhanced relevance on the external front, with Islamabad seizing the opportunity to act as a major diplomatic player, rather than a security concern. This is especially prescient given the current global context; where influence is increasingly seen as being tied to crisis management, a la the Board of Peace. Additionally, the move to mediation is also about containing the spill-over of conflict into Pakistan’s own sphere, whether through economic disruption, regional instability or security pressures.
There is also a sense among diplomatic practitioners that Pakistan’s past experience gives it the impetus to attempt such a role.
“We played [in the past] an important role in the release of US hostages from Iran,” former foreign secretary Jalil Abbas recalls.
Pakistan “at the highest level played an active and positive role in bringing about a ceasefire (during the 2026 war) and bringing the two conflicting parties to the negotiating table”, he adds, arguing that the present effort had already averted wider economic losses.
He also notes that Pakistan has looked after ‘Iranian interests’ in Washington for decades — the Pakistan embassy houses Tehran’s consular presence in the American capital — which, in his view, places it in a better position than many others.
That reading is shared by others. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi recalls that “Pakistan mediated between Iran and Iraq during Saddam’s time in the 1980s. It didn’t stop the war but the effort was made.”
The former diplomat, who is also executive director of the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) think tank, also cited Pakistan’s role in facilitating contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the context of Yemen, not too long ago. “This history qualified Pakistan to be a mediator.”
The emphasis, however, is on effort rather than outcome.
Others underscore how effective mediation depends less on history and more on credibility in the here and now. Former envoy to UN, US and UK, Maleeha Lodhi, observes that “a decisive factor is the mediator’s neutrality and credibility so that the two parties can have trust in the mediating country”.
That requirement becomes more demanding in an asymmetric conflict, where one side holds significantly greater leverage.
Translate This Article
